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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 21, 1990, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) intro-
duced the OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act (Senate Bill 2154)1, a bill
amending the criminal penalty provisions of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act).2 Senators Mikulski, Simon, Adams and
Kennedy were original co-sponsors. It was referred to the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources which ultimately adopted an amended ver-
sion of the bill on June 27, 1990.3 The 101st Congress ended in December
of 1990. The bill, not having been passed, was reintroduced by Senator
Metzenbaum in its amended form on February 20, 1991 as Senate Bill
445.4 Senators Jeffords, Adams, Simon, Mikulski, Harkin, Kennedy and
S. 2154, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
SENATE Comm. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, OSHA CRIMINAL PENALTY
REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 409, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990) [hereinafter, SENATE
COMM.]. The Committee accepted, by an 11-5 vote, an amendment in the nature
of a substitute offered by Senators Metzenbaum and Jeffords. Joining them in
favor of the bill were Senators Kennedy, Pell, Dodd, Simon, Harkin, Adams,
Mikulski, Bingaman and Durenberger. Senators Hatch, Kassenbaum, Cochran,
Coats and Thurmond opposed the legislation. Id. at 22.
4 S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill reads:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act."
SEC. 2. OSHA CRIMINAL PENALTIES.
(a) IN GENERAL - Section 17 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 666) is amended -
(1) in subsection (e) -
(A) by striking "fine of not more than $10,000" and inserting "fine in
accordance with section 3571 of title 18, United States Code,";
(B) by striking "six months" and inserting "10 years";
(C) by striking "fine of not more than $20,000" and inserting "fine in
accordance with section 3571 of title 18, United States Code,"; and
(D) by striking "one year" and inserting "20 years";
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Dodd were the new co-sponsors. It was again referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Human Resources. The legislation has not yet re-
turned to the Senate floor.
The OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act attempts to improve criminal
enforcement under the OSH Act by removing statutory barriers which
have hindered the waging of an aggressive criminal enforcement cam-
paign.5 It increases maximum prison terms for current criminal offenses
as follows: (1) for a willful violation of an OSHA standard which results
in death, from six months to 10 years for a first conviction and from one
year to 20 years for subsequent convictions; 6 (2) for providing advance
(2) in subsection (f), by striking "fine of not more than $1,000 or by im-
prisonment for not more than six months," and inserting "fine in accordance
with section 3571 of title 18, United States Code, or by imprisonment for not
more than 2 years,";(3) in subsection (g), by striking "fine of not more than $10,000, or byimprisonment for not more than six months," and inserting "fine in accord-
ance with section 3571 of title 18, United States Code, or by imprisonment
for not more than 1 year,";(4) by redesignating subsections (h) through (1) as subsections (i) through
(in), respectively;
(5) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection:
"(h) Any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or order pro-
mulgated pursuant to section 6, or any regulation prescribed pursuant to thisAct, and that violation causes serious bodily injury to any employee but does not
cause death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine in
accordance with section 3571 of title 18, United States Code, or by imprisonment
for not more than 5 years, or by both, except that if the conviction is for a violation
committed after a first conviction of such person, punishment shall be by a fine
in accordance with section 3571 of title 18, United States Code, or by imprison-
ment for not more than 10 years, or by both."; and(6) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(n) If a penalty or fine is imposed on a director, officer, or agent of an employer
under subsection (e), (f), (g), or (h) such penalty or fine shall not be paid out of
the assets of the employer on behalf of that individual.".(b) DEFINITION.- Section 3 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 652) is amended by adding
at the end the following new paragraph:
"(15) The term 'serious bodily injury' means bodily injury that involves -
"(A) a substantial risk of death;
"(B) protracted unconsciousness;
"(C) protracted and obvious physical disfigurement;
or
"(D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member,
organ, or mental faculty."(c) JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTION UNDER STATE AND LOCALCRIMINAL LAWS.-Section 17 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 666) (as amended by sub-
section (a) of this section) is further amended by adding at the end the following:
"(o) Nothing in this Act shall preclude State and local law enforcement agenciesfrom conducting criminal prosecutions in accordance with the laws of such State
or locality."
5SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 14.
6 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1988) with S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. §
2(a)(1)(B) (1991).
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notice of any OSHA inspection, from six months to 2 years;7 and (3) for
knowingly making false statements or representations in any OSHA re-
quired document, from six months to one year."
The bill also creates a new criminal offense for willful violation of an
OSHA standard which results in serious bodily injury. It carries with it
a maximum prison term of five years for a first conviction and ten years
for subsequent convictions. 9
In addition, Senate Bill 445 replaces existing criminal fines under the
OSH Act with a provision permitting imposition of fines in accordance
with 18 U.S.C. § 3571, in lieu of or in addition to a term of imprisonment.10
Section 3571 provides for significantly more stringent criminal fines than
those presently available. For example, the maximum fine for a willful
violation of an OSHA standard which results in the death of an employee
is presently $10,000 for a first conviction and $20,000 for subsequent
convictions." Under Senate Bill 445, § 3571 would allow for a maximum
fine of $250,000 per individual and $500,000 per corporation.' 2 Senate
Bill 445 further attempts to insure that the full force of these criminal
fines are felt by the guilty party in providing that any fines imposed upon
individual directors, officers or agents of an employer may not be paid
out of the assets of the employer on the individual's behalf.
13
Finally, the bill expressly preserves the right of state and local law
enforcement agencies to conduct criminal prosecutions under the laws of
their state or locality, 14 including such crimes as murder, reckless hom-
icide and assault.'5
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1988) with S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(2)
(1991).
1 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(g) (1988) with S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(3)
(1991).
1 S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(5) (1991). The original version of the bill
contained higher maximum prison terms of seven years for a first conviction and
fourteen years for subsequent convictions. It also contained a provision which
created a new criminal sanction for an employer who willfully violated an OSHA
standard which resulted in the reckless endangerment of human life, but did not
cause death or serious bodily injury. This offense was punishable by five years
imprisonment for a first conviction and ten years for subsequent convictions. S.
2154, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(4) (1990). The amended version of the bill excluded
this provision.
S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(A), (1)(C), (2)(3) (1991).
"29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1988).
12 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b),(c) (1988).
1- S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(6) (1991).
14 S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1991).
"1 The use of these historic state police powers to prosecute employers for willful
conduct that has caused workers to be killed or injured on the job stems from the
state's interest in controlling conduct which endangers the lives of its citizens.
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, GETTING AWAY wITH MURDER
IN THE WORKPLACE: OSHA'S NONUSE OF CRMINAL PENALTIES FOR SAFETY VIO-
LATION, H.R. REP. No. 1051, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4-5 (1988) [hereinafter HOUSE
Comm.].
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The legislation is intended to send a dual message:
To employers, the message is that willful violations of OSHA
standards that kill or seriously injure workers are crimes, notjust mistakes that can be written off as a cost of doing business.
To prosecutors and to regulators, the message is that Congress
is serious about protecting worker safety and health, and re-
sources should be devoted to that effort by investigating and
prosecuting OSH Act criminals.16
Present criminal penalty provisions under the OSH Act are outdated
and inadequate. They provide no meaningful deterrent to potential vio-
lators of workplace safety and health standards. An effective criminal
penalty system would complement civil enforcement efforts 17 as well as
enhance criminal enforcement efforts which have been virtually non-
existent.'
This Note is written to assist the reader in understanding the statutory
barriers which have hindered criminal enforcement of the OSH Act, and
how the OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act breaks down these barriers
to provide for a more effective criminal penalty structure. It begins with
a brief history behind the enactment of the OSH Act and its enforcement
record since 1970.
II. OSH ACT OF 1970: ENACTMENT AND ENFORCEMENT
Before 1910, most states followed the common law rules of liability in
determining the legal duties owed by an employer to an employee.'9 In
order to recover, courts required that an injured employee establish a
lack of proper diligence on the part of the employer which was typically
extremely difficult to prove in court. Usual witnesses to workplace injuries
were fellow workers who were reluctant to testify against the employer.
In addition, numerous employer defenses such as the "fellow servant
doctrine" and "assumption of risk" severely limited an employee's right
LSENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 4.
'
7 The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) criminal enforcement pro-gram demonstrates how an effective criminal penalty system can complement
civil enforcement efforts. In fiscal year 1989, 69 defendants were convicted of
environmental crimes with over 27 years of incarceration imposed and $12 millionin criminal fines assessed. EPA Office of Enforcement, Overview of EPA FederalPenalty Practices: FY 89 Apr. 1990 at 10, Table 3. Yet, during that same yearthe EPA assessed over $35.7 million in civil fines, setting a record for the amount
of civil penalties imposed. John F. Seymour, Civil and Criminal Liability of Cor-porate Officers Under Federal Environmental Laws, 19 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 337(1989).
18 In its first 18 years, only 42 cases had been referred by OSHA for criminalprosecution. Of those cases, only fourteen were prosecuted resulting in ten con-
viction with fines or suspended sentences. No one had ever even spent one dayin jail for a criminal violation of the OSH Act. HOUSE CoMM., supra note 15, at
4.
19 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPEN-
DIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 11 (1973) (hereinafter COMPENDIUM).
[Vol. 39:551
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to recovery.20 Factoring in the enormous expense of protracted litigation,
the worker faced overwhelming obstacles in pressing a claim.
21
As a result, beginning with New York in 1910,22 workmen's compen-
sation statutes were enacted by states to provide for more humane and
just laws to take the place of the inadequate common law system.23 Under
workmen's compensation statutes, an employee need only show that he
suffered a personal injury which "arose out of" and occurred "in the course
of" employment. Although this system virtually guarantees employee
recovery, the amount of recovery is limited by statute.
24
Besides replacing the lost income of injured employees and aiding their
return to the labor force, a primary objective of workmen's compensation
statutes was to prevent and reduce industrial accidents.25 It was hoped
that the system would provide significant financial incentives for em-
ployers to introduce measures that would decrease the frequency and
severity of accidents. However, through the years, workmen's compen-
sation statutes have provided few incentives for employers to maintain
safe workplaces. Statutes typically set fee and award schedules inde-
pendent of job-site conditions. While some compensation plans provide
for reduced costs to employers who have undertaken measures to reduce
the frequency and severity of industrial accidents, there does not appear
to be any indication that workmen's compensation statutes and premium
reduction programs have succeeded in stimulating employers to provide
safer work environments.
26
2 Id. at 12. The "fellow servant doctrine" permitted recovery only if the em-
ployee's injuries were the direct result of his employer's negligence. The employ-
ee's right of recovery against his employer was no greater than against a fellow
servant. Under the doctrine, the courts would proceed under the assumption that
the employee and employer stood on equal footing with one another. Thus, they
were considered "fellow servants" rather than master and servant. Id.
"Assumption of risk" was grounded on the premise that an employee who
voluntarily accepted employment entered into an implied contract with his em-
ployer. Under this contract, the employee was considered to assume not only the
ordinary risks of his occupation, but also any extraordinary risks he knew or
should have known. The employee was also said to assume all risks arising from
the negligence of his fellow servants. Id.
The enactment of employer liability statutes, beginning with the Georgia Act
of 1855, began to eliminate these limitations on employee's right to recovery, Id.
at 13.
21 COMPENDIUM, supra note 19, at 12.
22 New York's workmen compensation statutes were compulsory for certain
especially hazardous jobs and optional for others. Id. at 17.
2Id. at 14.
14Kenneth M. Koprowicz, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability For Workplace
Hazards: A Viable Option For Enforcing Workplace Safety?, 52 BROOKLYN LAW
REvIEW 183, 192 (1986). Under the old common law system, tort actions were
brought for injuries. Even though there were many obstacles to recovery, the jury
awards could run into the millions of dollars. Id. at 192.
-COMPENDIUM, supra note 19, at 24.
26 Koprowicz, supra note 24, at 193-95.
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The inability of states to insure workplace safety through common law
negligence doctrines and workmen's compensation statutes led Congress,
in 1970, to enact the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act),
requiring nationwide compliance with federal statutes. The stated pur-
pose of the OSH Act is to "assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. ' 27 To
accomplish this goal, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) was created. As an administrative and enforcement agency, it is
responsible for the establishment of safety and health standards and is
authorized to enforce them through civil and criminal penalties.
OSHA is entrusted with inspecting worksites,28 identifying unsafe prac-
tices and equipment,2 9 issuing citations,3 0 assessing civil penalties for
violations,3 1 and seeking injunctions in U.S. District Court when condi-
tions of immediate danger exist.32
OSHA also has authority to seek criminal prosecution against em-
ployers for: (1) a willful violation of an OSHA standard which results in
the death of an employee,3 3 (2) giving advance notice of an OSHA in-
spection,3 4 or (3) knowingly making false statements or representations
in documents required by OSHA.3 5 Criminal cases are referred by OSHA
to the Department of Justice; however, criminal prosecution requires the
recommendation of the Justice Department and the agreement of the
local U.S. District Attorney who is responsible for prosecuting the case. 36
27 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988). Congress identified the need for legislation in §
651(a), which reads:(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of
work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to,
interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical ex-
penses, and disability compensation payments.
In § 651(b), Congress identifies the source of its authority to enact and enforce
such legislation. It reads, in part:
(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the ex-
ercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and
with foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far
as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources.
This authority to regulate interstate commerce can be found in the United States
Constitution, Article II, § 8, Clause 3. Case law has clarified the extent of this
authority. Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce when the
activity: (1) is part of the "stream of commerce", Smith & Co. v. United States,
196 U.S. 325 (1905); (2) has a direct effect upon interstate commerce, Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); or, (3) has an indirect but substantial effect
upon interstate commerce, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
'8 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 657(a).
-0 29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
31 29 U.S.C. § 666(i)(j).
12 29 U.S.C. § 662(a).
'329 U.S.C. § 666(e).
' 29 U.S.C. § 666(f).
3529 U.S.C. § 666(g).
36 HOUSE COMM., supra note 15, at 3-4.
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Despite its auspicious beginnings, OSHA has been relatively ineffective
in reducing workplace injuries. Since its establishment in 1970, "more
than 100,000 workers have lost their lives because of unsafe working
conditions. It is estimated that annually 7,000-11,000 workers are killed
on the job and thousands more die from the long-term effects of occupa-
tional illnesses.
3 7
Ironically, OSHA's record with respect to seeking criminal prosecution
for workplace safety violations and fatalities has been appalling. In a
1988 report filed by the House Committee on Government Operations,
38
it was reported that in OSHA's first 18 years only forty-two cases had
been referred by OSHA for criminal prosecution. Of those cases, only
fourteen were prosecuted resulting in ten convictions with fines or sus-
pended sentences. No one had ever spent even one day in jail.3 9
OSHA's lethargic approach towards criminal prosecution is typified by
the 1983 death of a sixty-one year old immigrant worker, Stefan Golab.
40
Golab died from inhaling cyanide fumes while working at the Film Re-
covery Systems plant in suburban Chicago. The company was engaged
in the business of reclaiming silver from used x-ray film. Upon investi-
gating Golab's death, OSHA discovered numerous health and safety vi-
olations which contributed to the fatality. Contained in the plant were
seventy boiling vats full of used film from which lethal cyanide vapors
were being released. The floor was covered with cyanide-contaminated
solutions and warning labels on cyanide containers were painted over.
Immigrant workers, many unable to speak English, were unaware of the
unsafe conditions. OSHA ultimately issued a citation and fined the com-
pany $4,855 which was subsequently bargained down to less than $2,400.
It was not until 1989, some nineteen years after the enactment of the
OSH Act, that an employer actually served time in prison for a willful
violation of an OSHA safety standard.41 The defendant's company was
digging a fifteen-foot deep trench to replace an eighty-foot section of sewer
line when the trench walls collapsed, killing two workers. OSHA inves-
tigated the accident and discovered that the defendant company had will-
fully violated OSHA trenching standards.42 Thereupon, OSHA sent the
case to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. Despite pleading
37 Id.
The report was based on a study by the Employment and Housing Subcom-
mittee. Id. at 1.
- Id. at4.
- Id. at 1-2. See People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (follows
state criminal prosecution of Film Recovery and its agents for murder, involuntary
manslaughter and reckless conduct).
41 Head of South Dakota Firm Sentenced For Willful Violation of Trenching
Standard, 19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 716 (1989).
42Head of South Dakota Firm Pleads Guilty To Willful Violation in Trenching
Case, 19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 174 (1989).
1991]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
guilty, the defendant received a mere six-month sentence of which only
forty-five days were required to be served.43
This meager attempt at stricter criminal enforcement was, however,
short-lived. In April 1990, an OSHA criminal case involving another
trench cave-in fatality ended in a plea bargain." The employer, a willful
and repeated violator, paid a criminal fine of $7,500 and received a four-
month suspended sentence after an unsupported trench collapsed and
killed a utility worker.45
As stated by the House Committee on Government Operations:
The criminal penalty provisions of the OSH Act, as presently
written and as enforced by OSHA, provides [sic] no deterrent
to employers violating the statute. A company official who will-
fully and recklessly violates Federal OSHA laws stands a
greater chance of winning a State lottery than being criminally
charged by the Federal Government for workplace safety vio-
lations.46
The current Department of Labor has marginally increased criminal
enforcement, but this increased activity still cannot be considered a se-
rious effort at criminal enforcement. The Department of Labor's Inspector
General recently reviewed criminal enforcement efforts throughout the
Department for the fiscal year 1989. While twenty-seven criminal inves-
tigations were conducted by OSHA and fifteen were referred to the Justice
Department for prosecution, the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) pursued 460 criminal investigations, with twenty-five of the 100
cases reviewed by the Inspector General referred to the Department of
Justice for prosecution. 47
1 Head of South Dakota Firm Sentenced For Willful Violation of Trenching
Standard, 19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 716 (1989). The defendant was also placed on
probation. The conditions of his probation were that he refrain from engaging in
any trenching activity or excavation work for three years. In addition, he was
required to make restitution to the widow of one of the employees killed in the
accident. The restitution was for funeral expenses, counseling and lost wages.This amounted to $544 per month for three years or a lump sum payment of$21,452. Id. at 716.
"Kansas Businessman Pleads Guilty To Criminal Violation Of Trenching
Standard, 19 O.S.H.R. 1396 (1990).
Kansas Businessman Fined $7,500 For Criminal Violation Of Trenching
Rule, 19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 2052 (1990). The defendant was also ordered to join
the Kansas Contractors Association and develop an excavation program to share
with other employers. Id. at 2052.
HOUSE COMM., supra note 15, at 4.47 DEPT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT IN
DOL, Final Report No. 09-90-202-01-001, 17 June 4, 1990 at 17. The Senate
Committee noted that: The disparity between OSHA and MSHA criminal en-forcement is particularly striking considering that the OSH Act applies to nearly
90 million workers, whereas MSHA jurisdiction is limited to 354,000 miners.
Moreover, OSHA and MSHA share a philosophy, which is to rely primarily on
civil enforcement to ensure prompt abatement of workplace hazards. Yet reliance
on civil enforcement has not negated MSHA's willingness to pursue criminal
enforcement in appropriate cases. SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 6-7.
[Vol. 39:551
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OSHA's criminal enforcement record also fails miserably when com-
pared to the enforcement program administered by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). "In fiscal year 1989 alone, sixty-nine defendants
were convicted of environmental crimes, with over $12 million dollars in
criminal fines assessed and some twenty-seven years of incarceration
imposed.48
III. ENHANCED CRIMINAL PENALTIES
The purpose of the OSH Act is to protect the health and safety of
workers. 49 Although OSHA has traditionally been primarily a civil en-
forcement agency, 50 the existence of meaningful criminal sanctions would
enhance conformance to OSHA standards by deterring potential violators.
The need for effective criminal penalties has been acknowledged by the
Department of Justice: "[Ciriminal sanctions for violations ... should be
adequate to insure effective enforcement. While the civil provisions are
the primary method of enforcing the [OSH] Act, criminal sanctions in
appropriate cases are an important component of the enforcement
scheme."51
The Department of Labor's Acting Inspector General has been even
more emphatic on the need for criminal sanctions under the OSH Act:
"It is essential.., that criminal investigations and criminal remedies be
factored into the OSHA equation to deter needless injuries and deaths. ' 5 2
Even OSHA has realized the shortcomings of the criminal sanctions
under the OSH Act. In a 1989 interview with the National Safe Workplace
Institute, future OSHA Administrator Gerald F. Scannell stated that he
favored using more criminal penalties against employers who violate the
41 EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, Overview of EPA Federal Penalty Practices:
FY 89, Apr. 1990 at 10, Table 3.
49 The OSH Act states in pertinent part:
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise
of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with
foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources.
29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
50 Statement of Joseph A. Kinney, Executive Director, National Safe Workplace
Institute, Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources 5 (May 1, 1990) [hereinafter Kinney].
5' Letter from Carol Crawford, Assistant Attorney General For Legislative and
Intergovernmental Affairs, Dept. of Justice, to The Honorable Tom Lantos, Chair-
man, Subcommittee on Employment and Housing of the House Committee on
Government Operations 2 (January 16, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Crawford].
52 Serious Management Problems in the U.S. Government, 1989: Hearings Be-
fore the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 79, 82
(1989) (testimony of Raymond Maria, Acting Inspector General, Department of
Labor) [hereinafter Maria].
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OSH Act. He supported the "develop[ment] of a penalty [which would]
be more representative of the seriousness of the violation."-
Effective criminal enforcement, coupled with meaningful criminal
sanctions, would create a significant incentive for employers to provide
safe and healthful working conditions for their employees. Evidence from
local prosecutors in California and Texas who have aggressively pursued
OSH Act violators supports this conclusion. Texas experienced more than
fifteen construction trench fatalities in 1987. A local district attorney in
Austin County, Texas responded by instituting a highly publicized crim-
inal prosecution campaign against employers who willfully violated con-
struction safety standards. In 1988, there were only two reported
construction trench fatalities in Texas.54
In 1984, Los Angeles established the first occupational and safety sec-
tion in a local prosecutor's office in the country.5  Its purpose was to
provide a more aggressive program aimed at responsive identification
and investigation of potential criminal cases. The program provided an
investigator who was on call twenty-four hours a day to respond to the
scene of traumatic occupational fatalities in Los Angeles County.56
In only its first five years, district attorney personnel have responded
to more than 200 workplaces, resulting in the filing of twenty-seven
criminal cases.5 7 Surprisingly, none of the cases filed by the occupational
and safety section involved intentional violations of established safety or
health standards. The fatalities were the result of either a reckless or
negligent act, or a failure to act. Nevertheless, in each case the defendant
violated his duty of care to another human being which, under California
law, is criminal. 51
As noted by the Los Angeles District Attorney, "[the] Occupational
Safety and Health enforcement program has made a substantial differ-
ence in convincing corporate managers and supervisors that safety in the
workplace should be given high priority.... The number of prosecutions
may be small, but like a barking dog, their very presence may deter
thousands of violations."5 9
The provisions of the OSH Act permit the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions where there has been a willful violation of an OSHA standard which
resulted in the death of an employee.60 However, the maximum penalty
is only a $10,000 fine and six months imprisonment, a mere misdemeanor.
By contrast, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which
deals with the transportation, storage and disposal of hazardous waste,
51 OSHA Nominee Calls Penalty System A 'Priority' Issue, Promotes Changes,
19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 603 (1989) [hereinafter OSHA Nominee].
Kinney, supra note 50, at 5-6.5 Ira Reiner & Jan Chatten-Brown, When It Is Not An Accident, But A Crime:
Prosecutors Get Tough With OSHA Violations, 17 N. Ky. L. REV. 83,95-96 (1989).
mId. at 95-96.
571 Id. at 96.
1Id. at 103.
59Id.
w 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1988).
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provides for a penalty of up to $250,000 and/or fifteen years imprisonment
for knowingly placing another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury."' The Clean Water Act contains a similar "knowing
endangerment" provision.6 2 The Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) establishes a felony
for knowingly failing to report a hazardous substance release by providing
for a maximum prison term of three years.6 . Originally, these Acts did
not provide for such severe penalties. They were amended by Congress
in response to increased concern that environmental offenses be punished
more severely.- The OSH Act is in desperate need of similar amendments.
The lack of meaningful criminal sanctions under the OSH Act provides
no deterrent effect upon potential violators. They are weak and in need
of strengthening before any significant deterrence can be realized. As
concluded by Johannes Andenaes in The General Preventive Effects of
Punishment, "the general preventive effect of the criminal law increases
with the growing severity of penalties.
65
The Department of Labor's comments support this conclusion:
Achieving a credible deterrent, practically speaking, is the only
way to achieve broadbased compliance with the law. An inor-
dinate reliance on civil and administrative remedies does not
promote deterrence. That approach fosters nothing more than
an environment in which the transgression is worth commit-
ting because the benefits are so high, the risk and costs of being
caught are so low. Those who would consider committing crimes
within this environment.., need pause and ask only one ques-
tion, 'Can I afford the fine?.' There is a visible odium that
accrues to being indicted, convicted and jailed. I submit that
it is the specter of precisely this kind of disgrace which will
add to the credible deterrent.
6
6
As compared to the sanctions provided for under the Clean Water Act
and CERCLA, those established under the OSH Act are a mere slap on
61 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1984).
62 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (1986).
42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1987).
- RCRA was amended in 1984, increasing the maximum incarceration penalty
for knowingly placing a person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury from 5 to 15 years. John F. Seymour, Civil and Criminal Liability of
Corporate Officers Under Federal Environmental Laws, 19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 337,
346 (1989). See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). CERCLA and the Clean Water Act were
amended in 1986 and 1987, respectively, increasing criminal penalties and raising
certain violations of the act to the level of felonies. Id. at 337. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(e) (imprisonment for not more than 15 years for knowingly placing another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury); and 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 (c)(3)(A) (imprisonment for not more than fifteen years for knowing vio-
lation of various provisions of the Clean Water Act).
Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 949, 970 (1966).
Maria, supra note 52, at 84.
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the hand. In addition to providing no deterrent effect upon potential
violators, they provide no incentive for prosecutors to aggresively pursue
prosecuting the cases. This problem was acknowledged by Cynthia Att-
wood, Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health, Department
of Labor: "My perception is that very often the attitude in the U.S. At-
torney's offices is that misdemeanors are just not as important as felonies.
They don't count as much on their ledger in terms of, 'What did we
accomplish this year?"'8 7
This perception is supported by the general guidelines for prosecutorial
discretion established by the Justice Department. Since federal judicial
resources are not sufficient to prosecute every case, prosecutors must
decide which cases are worth pursuing. The guidelines for prosecutorial
discretion include: (1) whether there will be sufficient deterrent value
gained through prosecution, (2) whether the sentence is sufficiently re-
lated to the seriousness of the crime and (3) whether, in the event of
conviction, the sentence would be sufficient to cover the necessary in-
vestment of prosecutorial resources. 6
Under the OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act, increased maximum
criminal fines and terms of imprisonment are consistent with similar
penalty provisions within other federal criminal codes.69 In addition, a
willful violation resulting in the death of an employee, presently a mis-
demeanor under the OSH Act, would be reclassified as a felony.- These
increased criminal sanctions not only better reflect the serious nature of
the offenses, but provide added incentive for prosecutors to pursue crim-
inal prosecution, resulting in a more effective deterrent to potential will-
ful violators.
Obviously, an essential element of the OSH Act provision which es-
tablishes criminal sanctions for causing the death of an employee is the
presence of a "willful" violation. However, no definition of "willful" ap-
pears in the OSH Act. Senate Bill 445 was not intended to change the
current interpretation of the term "willful" by the courts under the OSH
Act and general principles of criminal law.7 1 This interpretation was
explained by the court in Brock v. Morello Brothers Construction, Inc.,72
67 Criminal Prosecution: A BNA Interview With Cynthia L. Attwood and Daniel
J. Mick, Labor Department Solicitor's Office, 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1052, 1054(1987).
r SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 9, citing Letter from Thomas M. Boyd,Assistant Attorney General for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, De-partment of Justice, to The Honorable Tom Lantos, Chairman, Subcommittee onEmployment and Housing of the House Committee on Government Operations
3-4 (Dec. 9, 1988).
6 See criminal codes cited supra note 64.70 Felony is defined as "[Ainy offense punishable by death or imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year." BLACK's LAw DIcTiONARY 555 (5th ed. 1979).
71 SENATE Comm., supra note 3, at 16. The Committee's comments were in
reference to an amended revision of Senate Bill 2154, which was ultimately
adopted. See SENATE Comm., supra note 3, at 22. The amended version was later
reintroduced as Senate Bill 445. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7 809 F.2d 161, 163-64 (1st Cir. 1987).
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which held that "willful" requires not only that the offender intended to
perform the unlawful act, but also that he knew what he did was unlawful.
The Committee accepted leaving the existing interpretation of "willful"
intact to avoid confusion and uncertainty. They reasoned that employers
are already familiar with the types of conduct that would be considered
willful under the OSH Act and may result in criminal prosecution. Ac-
cordingly, they will be better able to plan their activities to avoid the
criminal sanctions provided for in the new legislation.73
IV. SERIOUS BODILY INJURY
An even more glaring example of the deficiency of the criminal pro-
visions under the OSH Act is the absence of any criminal sanction for a
willful violation that does not result in death but causes serious bodily
injury. The Pymm Thermometer 74 case dramatically illustrates this in-
adequacy. In October 1985, an OSHA inspector discovered that the Pymm
Thermometer plant in Brooklyn, N.Y. was exposing workers to dangerous
levels of mercury which had actually resulted in permanent brain damage
to one employee and posed serious health risks to many others. The hidden
cellar operation where the employees worked was virtually without ven-
tilation. It was filled with broken thermometers, pools of mercury were
on the floor and noxious vapors were in the air.
OSHA had previously inspected the plant in March, 1981, and issued
citations for serious health violations. No protective gear such as gloves,
respirators or aprons were being used to reduce workers' exposure to
mercury. OSHA assessed a fine of $1,400 and set a deadline of October,
1981, for the company to clean up the factory; but the deadline was
regularly extended over the next few years. As a result of overexposure
to noxious mercury vapors, an employee sustained permanent brain dam-
age. Because the employer's willful violation of OSHA standards did not
result in an employee's death, but "merely" permanent brain damage,
OSHA could not statutorily pursue criminal prosecution.
The use of death as a trigger point completely undermines the deterrent
effect of the OSHA criminal enforcement system.75 As noted by the Com-
mittee on Labor and Human Resources:
73 SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 16.
74 People v. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1989); HousE COMM., supra note 15, at
6. Under New York law the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy, falsifying
business records, assault and reckless endangerment. These convictions were
upheld on appeal. The New York Supreme Court held that the OSH Act does not
preempt the state from criminally prosecuting defendants for conduct which is
regulated by OSHA. Id.
75 SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 10.
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[I]f an employer willfully violates the OSH Act, thereby killing
a worker, criminal sanctions under the OSH Act apply. If that
same employer engages in the same willful violation and the
worker suffers permanent brain damage or paralysis, but is
not killed, then there is no criminal penalty whatsoever under
the OSH Act. The availability of a criminal sanction should
not turn on factors that may be completely outside the control
of the perpetrator and in some cases may be a matter of sheer
luck. 76
The use of trigger points other than death for imposition of criminal
sanctions is not unusual in federal legislation, especially in the area of
environmental law. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act pro-
vides for a maximum fifteen year penalty for disposing of hazardous
wastes knowing that such action places another person in imminent dan-
ger of death or serious bodily injury."v The Clean Water Act contains a
similar "knowing endangerment" provision.78
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is not hesitant to pursue
these criminal sanctions when appropriate. On May 20, 1988, a Phila-
delphia-based chemical company and four of its corporate officials were
indicted for failing to correct known structural weakness in a holding
tank which resulted in its collapse. 79 Similarly, on February 23, 1989,
three civilian managers at a U.S. Army Department's proving ground
were convicted of knowingly storing and disposing of hazardous wastes
without a permit in violation of RCRA.8°
The OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act establishes a new criminal
sanction for "willful" violation of an OSHA standard which causes "se-
rious bodily injury" to an employee, but does not result in death.,' To
emphasize the seriousness of the offense, Senate Bill 445 provides for
imposition of a fine in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3571 and imprisonment
of up to five years for a first conviction and ten years for subsequent
convictions. This offense is therefore classified as a felony. The addition
of a criminal sanction for serious bodily injury would not only close a
glaring loophole in the current law, but it would also lead to a more
equitable and predictable system of sanctions, and improve the deterrent
impact of OSHA's criminal enforcement effort. 82
Though "willful" appears in the OSH Act, it is not defined. "Serious
bodily injury" does not appear in the OSH Act and has never been in-
terpreted nor defined by the courts under the OSH Act for OSHA purposes.
The term appears dozens of times in the United States Code and is defined
76 SENATE Comm., supra note 3, at 10.
" 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1976).
78 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (1977).
79 SEYMOUR, supra note 64.
'Id. at 337.
8, S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(5) (1991).
12 SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 11.
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for sentencing purposes by the United States Sentencing Commission.83
The courts have interpreted the term as it applies to general principles
of criminal law, and have provided detailed jury instructions on the mean-
ing of "serious bodily injury." In U.S. v. Johnson,8 the court determined
that the absence of a detailed explication of "serious bodily injury" in a
statute which employs the term implies that Congress never intended
rigid, limiting definitions to be applied to the phrase. 5 The court favored
a "weighing process" in which the jury would consider certain factors in
determining whether the injuries constituted serious bodily injury.
Among these factors were whether the victim suffered a substantial risk
of death; extreme physical pain; protracted and obvious disfigurement;
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ,
or mental faculty; protracted unconsciousness; and significant or sub-
stantial internal damage. 86 The court held that "[tihe presence or absence
of any of these factors is not determinative, since the jury must use its
own judgment to access the severity of the injuries. '
7
As previously noted in discussing the interpretation of the term "will-
ful" under the OSH Act, an important consideration was that the appli-
cation of the term would be fairly consistent to allow employers the ability
to ascertain what types of conduct would be considered willful and subject
to criminal prosecution." The problem with the definition for "serious
bodily injury" in Johnson was that it included terms which were overly
subjective and which left their relative significance up to the discretion
of the jury on a case by case basis. This would limit its predictability and
therefore the deterrent value of the new offense.
Under Senate Bill 445, "serious bodily injury" must involve actual
bodily injury as well as: (1) a substantial risk of death; (2) protracted
unconsciousness; (3) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (4) pro-
tracted impairment or loss of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. 9
This is consistent with existing definitions so as to further uniformity of
federal criminal law, but somewhat more restrictive to enhance its pre-
dictability.
81 The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(iv) (1977) defines "serious
bodily injury" as "bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, un-
consciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted loss or impairment of the func-
tion of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(6)(D) (1976), includes "protracted and
obvious disfigurement" The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §
802(25) (1906), does not require "unconsciousness" or "extreme physical pain."
The U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines use a somewhat different definition.
It defines "serious bodily injury" as "injury involving extreme physical pain or
the impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty; or
requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical re-
habilitation". FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 1 B1.1 at 1.13 (1991).
", 637 F.2d 1224 (1980).
" Id. at 1245.
88Id. at 1246.
87 Id.
8s SENATE CoMM., supra note 3, at 18.
89 S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1991).
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The Department of Labor has expressed concern that the creation of a
criminal offense for "serious bodily injury" would hinder OSHA's civil
enforcement and abatement efforts.90 Their concern centered around what
they believed would be a changing of OSHA's focus from primarily a civil
enforcement program to a criminal one. Employers would react to this
heightened criminal focus by refusing to cooperate with OSHA in ob-
taining prompt abatement of workplace safety and health hazards. They
feared that employers would demand that OSHA secure search warrants
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment before entering their plant for even
routine inspections. In addition, civil as well as criminal cases would have
a much higher contest rate, resulting in expensive and protracted liti-
gation.91
These fears are unsubstantiated and inconsistent with the experience
of state and local officials who have been active in prosecuting workplace
crimes under state and local criminal laws. As noted earlier, the Los
Angeles District Attorney's occupational safety and health criminal en-
forcement program had a substantial impact "in convincing corporate
managers and supervisors that safety in the workplace should be given
high priority."92
. In Texas, the Travis County (Austin) District Attorney instituted an
aggressive criminal enforcement program aimed at criminal prosecution
of employers who willfully violated construction standards. This well-
publicized program succeeded in reducing the annual number of construc-
tion trench fatalities from fifteen to two in only one year.93
1* Statement of Gerald F. Scannell, Assistant Secretary Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, United States Department of Labor, Before the Sub-
committee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources 8-
12 (May 1, 1990) [hereinafter Scannell]. These statements were quite a retraction
from his comments as a nominee for the position of Occupational Safety and
Health Administrator less than one year earlier. In an interview with the Na-
tional Safe Workplace Institute in August of 1989, Scannell said he intended to
revamp OSHA's criminal penalty system, giving greater emphasis to criminal
prosecution. He favored using more criminal penalties against employers who
violate OSHA standards and the "develop[ment] [of] a penalty structure which
[would] be more representative of the seriousness of the violation." OSHA Nom-
inee, supra note 53, at 603.
91 Scannell, supra note 90, at 8-12. These fears were shared by the minority
members of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources who opposed
the adoption of amended Senate Bill 2154:
The objective of S. 2154 is to punish violators by means of criminal penalties.
Conversely, the objective of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
is to eliminate all foreseeable and preventable workplace hazards through
civil enforcement efforts that will lead to the quick abatement of those
hazards. The crux of this policy issue is abatement versus penalty. This
legislation will do nothing but upset the balance envisioned for OSHA; the
result being a long string of lengthy court proceedings and appeals: This,
in turn, will only serve as a counterproductive measure in OSHA's attempt
to protect the safety and health of the American workplace.
SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 26.
mReiner & Chatten-Brown, supra note 55, at 103.
93 Kinney, supra note 50, at 5-6.
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There is no evidence that increased criminal enforcement in the en-
vironmental area has hurt the EPA's ability to obtain civil enforcement
or abatement. "In fiscal year 1989 alone, sixty-nine defendants were con-
victed of environmental crimes, with over 12 million dollars in criminal
fines assessed and some twenty-seven years of incarceration imposed. '94
However, during that same period the EPA set records in the amount of
civil penalties assessed, with civil-based judicial and administrative pen-
alties topping $35.7 million.95
V. STATE PREEMPTION
The lack of criminal prosecutions for willful violations of the OSH Act
stem from OSHA's reluctance to proceed and the Justice Department's
lethargic handling of those cases actually referred by OSHA.96 While the
federal government has failed to seek criminal penalties for workplace
safety violations, state and local prosecutors have attempted to use the
states' historic police powers to prosecute employers for willful conduct
that has resulted in workers being killed or injured on the job.97 This
-DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 47, at 17.
9 Seymour, supra note 64, at 337.
HoUSE COMM., supra note 15, at 4-5.
97HOUSE COMM., supra note 15, at 8. See People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414
N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); People v. O'Neil, 550
N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1989); People
v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 515 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
ASTA v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 51 (1989); State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425 N.W.2d
21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), reh'g denied, 430 N.W.2d 351 (Wis. 1988) (prosecution
of a fireworks manufacturer for reckless homicide, based upon knowledge of nu-
merous fire hazards); People v. Hegedus, 425 N.W. 2d 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988),
rev'd, 443 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1989) (cable TV splicer's supervisor was charged
with involuntary manslaughter for the carbon monoxide poisoning of the splicer
in a defective truck); and Sabine Consol., Inc. v. Tex., 756 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (company and its managers charged with negligent homicide for two
trenching deaths).
Los Angeles Assistant District Attorney Jan Chatten-Brown described one
such prosecution:
Our first involuntary manslaughter prosecution was against the president
of a small drilling company who sent a worker down a 33-foot hole - if you
can envision this - that was only 16 to 18 inches in diameter. The worker
was lowered into the hole that was being drilled for an elevator shaft with
his foot through a sling. He had no safety harness. The air was not tested.
And the sides of the well were not encased. When the worker went into
seizures and the rescue personnel responded, they were told that they could
not pump oxygen into the hole because the sides of the wall might collapse.
Therefore, by the time they were able to remove the victim, he was dead.
HouSE COMM., supra note 15, at 8.
Cook County, Illinois State's Attorney Richard Daley explained why Illinois
has taken an active role in prosecuting workplace injuries and fatalities as crim-
inal acts: "We are not enforcing Government standards, as OSHA does. Rather,
we are enforcing our criminal code to protect the people of Cook County from
gross misconduct." Id. at 10.
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stems from the state's interest in controlling conduct which endangers
the lives of its citizens, whether it be recklessly operating an automobile
or an automobile plant.98 Unfortunately, many state court convictions
have been challenged or appealed on the ground that the Federal OSH
Act preempts State prosecution for workplace injuries and fatalities.99
The preemption issue surrounds Article VI, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution, commonly referred to as the Supremacy Clause,
which states in part that the "[C]onstitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... made in pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of
the Land. . . ." Furthermore, the States "shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing."
Case law has clarified the practical application of this clause. Under
the Supremacy Clause, federal law may preempt state law in several
ways. Congress may preempt state law by expressly stating so on the
face of a statute.Iw° In the absence of explicit language to the contrary,
preemption is implied where federal legislation is so comprehensive in a
given area that it leaves no room for supplemental state legislation.101
Preemption may also be found where it is physically impossible to comply
with both federal and state regulations,1 0 2 or where a state law interferes
with the purposes and objectives of a congressional statute. 0 3
Defendants have raised the preemption claim in state courts seeking
to use the Federal OSH Act as a shield against state criminal prosecu-
tion.1 0 4 Preemption advocates contend that the OSH Act expressly
preempts state prosecution under general criminal statutes for workplace-
related fatalities or injuries over which Federal OSHA has jurisdiction.
98 George H. Cohen, Pre-emption: A Union Lawyer's View, 17 N. Ky. L. REv.
153, 162 (1989). See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958) ("It has
long been recognized as the very essence of our federalism that the States should
have the widest latitude in the administration of their own systems of criminaljustice."). See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) ("[P]reventing
and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the
Federal Government."); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) ("[T]he
States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and
prosecuting crimes.").
" See cases cited supra note 97. All of the reported cases were appealed on
grounds of state pre-emption, except for People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990). The defendants in O'Neil appealed on grounds that the judgments
rendered were inconsistent and the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to support the convictions of murder, involuntary manslaughter and reckless
conduct.
11o Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).101 Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987); Hillsborough County
v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
203-04 (1983).
102 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
o Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
o HoUSE COMM., supra note 15, at 8.
[Vol. 39:551
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss4/6
OSHA CRIMINAL PENALTY REFORM ACT
Whether state law is preempted by the OSH Act is a question of congres-
sional intent. This determination turns on two sections of the OSH Act:
§ 667(a) which provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State
agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State Law over any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is
in effect under section 655 of this title"'10 5 and § 667(b) which reads:
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility
for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety
and health standards relating to any occupational safety or
health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been
promulgated under section 655 of this. title shall submit a State
plan for the development of such standards and their enforce-
ment. 1
0 6
Where a state occupational safety and health plan has been approved,
there is no issue of preemption. Preemption only becomes an issue in
those states without an approved OSHA plan. Twenty-seven states do not
have such a plan. State courts that have addressed the preemption issue
have split.'0 7
The preemption argument is grounded on the assumption that § 667(a)
and § 667(b) of the OSH Act demonstrate congressional intent to preempt
all state laws that in any way could relate to workplace safety or health,
including criminal laws of general application. In Sabine Consol., Inc. v.
State,l0 8 the Texas Court of Appeals held that § 667(a) "absolutely
preempts all state regulation of workplace safety where such regulation
would effectively establish state safety standards in areas governed by
OSHA." 1°9 The defendants, a corporate employer and its president, suc-
ceeded in having the Texas Court of Appeals overturn their criminally
negligent homicide conviction.
The charges stemmed from the deaths of employees caused when a
trench the employees were working in collapsed as a result of its con-
struction in violation of OSHA standards. The court reasoned that:
105 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988).
10629 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988).
'0' SENATE CoMM., supra note 3, at 12. See, e.g., People v. Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d
127 (Mich. 1989). The court felt that the OSH Act contained only a few very
minor criminal sanctions that could hardly be intended to compose a compre-
hensive and exclusive scheme. They concluded that the interpretation which was
most consistent with the OSH Act's goal of insuring safe and healthful workplaces
is that "Congress did not intend to preclude state penalties but [rather] intended
to allow states to supplement OSHA penalties with their own sanctions." Id. at
137. See Note, Getting Away With Murder: Federal OSHA Pre-emption of State
Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARv. L. REV. 535, 542-43
(1987). See also State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Wis. Ct.
App.), reh'g denied, 430 N.W.2d 351 (1988) (stating that "the state's authority to
enforce its criminal laws in the workplace has not been barred or abridged by
OSHA.").108 756 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App. 1988).
119 Id. at 868.
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while the criminal actions ... [did] not literally purport to
establish worker safety standards, the criminal charges were
based on a failure to perform a duty found in a statute which
does prescribe safety standards. The practical effect of such
charges is to set up a body of state law affecting workplace
safety issues already governed by federal standards promul-
gated pursuant to § 655 of OSHA.11°
The Colorado District Court took a similar approach in Colorado v.Kehran.111 This case involved a trench cave-in which resulted in the death
of four workers. The defendants were charged with criminally negligent
homicide for negligent construction of trenches which caused the death
of the workers. The court held that:
[t]he determinative factor is not whether the State is seeking
to enforce a criminal law of general application rather than
specific workplace health and safety regulations but rather
what conduct the State is seeking to regulate.... [T]he conduct
the People here seek to regulate is the conduct related to work-
ing conditions which is exactly the same as that regulated by
OSHA.
112
In Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York City,11 3 the U.S.
Court of Appeals held that "the OSH Act deprives states and their political
subdivisions only of their jurisdiction over those occupational safety and
health issues covered by a federal standard. The Act ... leave[s] states
free to regulate when their purpose is to safeguard public - as opposed to
occupational - health and safety."'114
Despite such case history to the contrary, a close review of the OSH
Act supports a finding that the OSH Act was never intended by Congress
to preempt state criminal prosecutions of workplace injuries. The Savings
Clause (§ 653(b)(4)) found in the Act precludes an interpretation of the
OSH Act that would result in express preemption. Section 653(b)(4) states:
Nothing in [the OSH Act] shall be construed to supersede or
in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to
enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common
law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and
employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or
death of employees arising out of, or in the course of employ-
ment.115
110 Id.
'"13 O.S.H.C. 1898 (1988).
"'Id. at 1900.
"' 855 F.2d 48 (2nd Cir. 1988).
"'Id. at 60.
11129 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1988).
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This logically follows from the very intent behind the enactment of the
OSH Act itself. Congress made it clear that it did not intend to occupy
the field. 18 State criminal prosecution of workplace safety violations sup-
port and complement, rather than conflict with, the Federal OSH Act.117
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals echoed these feelings in State ex rel.
Cornellier v. Black."8 The court observed nothing in the OSH Act which
indicated a compelling congressional directive that a state may not en-
force its homicide laws in the workplace. In fact, it held that "compliance
with federal safety and health regulations is consistent.. . with the dis-
charge of the state's duty to protect the lives of employees, and all other
citizens, through enforcement of its criminal laws."119
116 See People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. 1989).
[Tihe purpose underlying [the OSH Act] was to ensure that OSHA would
create a nationwide floor of effective safety and health standards and provide
for the enforcement of those standards.... It was not fear that States would
apply more stringent standards or penalties than OSHA that concerned
Congress but that the States would apply lesser ones which would not
provide the necessary level of safety.
Id. at 967. "[P]rosecutions of employers who violate State criminal law by failing
to maintain safe working conditions for their employees will surely further OS-
HA's stated goal of 'assur[ing] so far as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."' Id. at 969. See supra Part
II.
117 HOUSE COMM., supra note 15, at 9. The Commitee stated:
It would have been most illogical for Congress specifically to authorize a
private right to employees to pursue claims under State tort law for injuries
incurred in the course of employment while at the same time prohibiting
States from using their police power and criminal laws to punish the in-
tentional acts that caused these same injuries.
See Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Pre-emption of State Crim-
inal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARv. L. REV. 535 (1987).
The OSH Act established a federal scheme to accomplish what the states
seemed unable or unwilling to do on their own: create effective standards
to prevent accidents and diseases in the workplace. Congress intended to
fill a gap in the existing state-by-state regulatory framework, not to replace
it with a narrower framework. A system of OSHA regulation supplemented
by state criminal prosecutions thus provides an appropriate range of gov-
ernmental responses to dangerous employer practices. In practice, state
criminal prosecutions are likely to play only a limited role in the overall
enforcement scheme. They no doubt will confront the same problems that
stymied state enforcement schemes before OSHA: the difficulty of overcom-
ing the procedural barriers and higher burden of proof under criminal stat-
utes, and the economic pressure to police industry less vigorously than
competing states. State criminal prosecutions, therefore, are by no means
a substitute for a strong and effective OSHA. They do, however, provide a
useful supplement to ensure that workers are more adequately protected
and that particularly egregious employer conduct does not go unpunished.
Id. at 554.
See also, Cohen, supra note 98.
[lt would be paradoxical in the extreme for any court to hold that a Congress
whose primary goal was 'to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions' neverthe-
less enacted a statute that deprived employees of the longstanding protec-
tion provided by state criminal laws. Id. at 175.
1" 425 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
19 Id. at 25.
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The Michigan Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in People
v. Hegedus.12 It viewed OSHA as "primarily regulatory in nature, de-
signed to prevent workplace deaths and injuries before they occur....
[Ilts emphasis is on the promulgation of health and safety standards and
enforcement and review procedures, rather than the assessment of pen-
alties for injuries already suffered."' 21 In contrast, general state criminal
laws were viewed as "ex post, reactive measures, focusing on conduct
after an injury has occurred.."122 With this distinction in mind, the court
interpreted § 667(b) as expressly limiting only the development and en-
forcement of state standards, and did not therefore affect the enforcement
of state criminal laws.
The Department of Labor expressly endorsed the need to protect the
efforts of state and local prosecutors by acknowledging that "[sitates
should not be preempted from enforcing criminal laws of general appli-
cability, such as those dealing with murder, manslaughter, or assault."124
limited criminal penalties provided by the Act to deprive employees of
the protection provided by State laws of general applicability."123
The Department of Labor expressly endorsed the need to protect the
efforts of state and local prosecutors by acknowledging that "[sjtates
should not be preempted from enforcing criminal laws of general appl-
icability, such as those dealing with murder, manslaughter, or assault."124
There has been and continues to be considerable uncertainty in the
courts regarding the issue of state preemption. The uncertainty surrounds
confusion as to whether Congress intended the OSH Act to preempt state
criminal prosecutions. This confusion has had the effect of contravening
state criminal prosecutions. The continued threat of state or local pros-
ecution is essential for effective deterrence of potential violators. There-
fore, it is imperative that Congress expressly reaffirm its intent under
the OSH Act not to preempt state enforcement of its criminal laws of
general applicability in prosecutions related to workplace injuries or fa-
talities. Senate Bill 445 would expressly preserve a state and locality's
right to prosecute employers for acts against their employees which con-
stitute crimes under state or local law. 25
120 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1989).
1 Id. at 129.
122 Id. at 132.
'- SENATE CoMm., supra note 3, at 13, citing letter from Thomas M. Boyd,
Assistant Attorney General for Legistlative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Dep't
of Justice, to the Honorable Tom Lantos, Chairman, Subcommittee on Employ-
ment and Housing of the House Committee on Government Operations, 2-3 (De-
cember 9, 1988).
" Scannell, supra note 90, at 12-13.
125 S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1991). The bill provides: "Nothing in
this Act shall preclude State and local law enforcement agencies from conducting
criminal prosecutions in accordance with the laws of such State or locality."
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VI. CORPORATE PERSONAL LIABILITY
Under the OSH Act, criminal fines levied against corporate offenders
can be paid out of the assets of the organization. This "loophole" reduces
the deterrent effect of the criminal sanctions on individual corporate
offenders by allowing fines to be passed on to the corporation and written
off as a cost of doing business. The OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act
attempts to enhance the deterrent impact of criminal fines by holding
convicted individuals personally responsible for the payment of any such
fine imposed. 1
26
Problems have plagued the imposition of criminal sanctions against
individual corporate offenders. Under the OSH Act, criminal sanctions
apply only to employers "engaged in a business affecting commerce who
[have] employees.' 1 27 Some defendants have successfully contended that
only the corporation has employees and affects commerce; and therefore,
corporate officers are not subject to punishment under the OSH Act.12
Since a corporation cannot be jailed, imputing broad criminal respon-
sibility on them would merely make available additional money fines.
Therefore, success by a defendant on this issue would provide a shield
against criminal prosecution and significantly reduce the deterrent effect
of the criminal sanctions. For this reason, the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, in adopting amended Senate Bill 2154 (subsequently
reintroduced as Senate Bill 445), explicitly adopted the Department of
Justice's position on corporate criminal liability:' 29 "[C]ulpable supervi-
sors and corporate officers, as well as other persons who have a responsible
share in the prohibited conduct, may be punished as principals under
[the OSH Act] for aiding and abetting or for willfully causing an em-
ployer's violation."'23 This stance ensures that culpable corporate indi-
viduals will be subject to criminal sanctions, regardless of whether they
technically meet the definition of "employer" within the OSH Act.
,26 S. 445, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(6) (1991). The bill provides: "(n) If a
penalty or fine is imposed on a director, officer, or agent of an employer... such
penalty or fine shall not be paid out of the assets of the employer on behalf of
that individual."
127 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1988).
12 Michael H. Levin, Crimes Against Employees: Substantive Criminal Sanc-
tions Under The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 14 AMER. CRIM. L. REv. 717,
730-31 (1977). See United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975).
The district court orally granted a motion to dismiss all counts of the indictment
against the company's president as an individual, holding "the evidence ... quite
clear that the corporation was the employer" despite testimony that the president
was intimately involved in daily operations and "might have been out on the
[fatal] site that day." Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d at 87-88.
129 SENATE CoMm., supra note 3, at 21.
130 Crawford, supra note 51, at 5.
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VII. DETERRENCE AND RISK
Deterrence theories are founded on the belief that punishment should
be designed to deter the commission of future offenses rather than to
exact retribution on convicted offenders. The most plausible way to in-
crease the deterrent effect of punishment is to increase both the risk of
conviction and the severity of punishment.'13
The OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act focuses on increasing the
severity of punishment; however, it is essential that an active enforcement
program be established to increase the risk of conviction and thereby
maximize the deterrent effect of the criminal sanctions. 132 As noted by
the House Committee on Government Operations:
There is an institutional reluctance by OSHA, the Justice De-
partment, and the U.S. Attorney's Office to pursue criminal
prosecutions in workplace safety cases. There is a need for
OSHA to be more aggressive and timely in using available
criminal sanctions. Unless the OSH statute is beefed up and
vigorously enforced by OSHA to punish criminally those who
show willful disregard for worker safety, some employers will
continue 'to get away with murder. 1 33
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was enacted "to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions."1 34 In its twenty year history, it has fallen
well short of this auspicious goal. Its failure to insure safer working
conditions is a result of statutory limitations as well as a reluctance by
OSHA and the Justice Department to pursue criminal prosecution.
The OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act (Senate Bill 445) was intro-
duced by Senator Howard Metzenbaum on February 20, 1991. The leg-
islation is necessary to modify the criminal penalty provisions of the OSH
Act to eliminate the statutory barriers which have not only failed to
provide an adequate deterrent to potential Violators of workplace safety
and health standards, but which have also hindered OSHA's ability to
enforce the Act.
"'SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 149 (5th ed. 1989). Opponents of the deterrence theory attack its
practice of punishing one individual for the potential acts of another as unjust
and inhumane. Id. at 149.
13"ld. at 150-51.
133HOUSE Comm., supra note 15, at 11.
13429 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
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"Beefed up" criminal sanctions are, however, only one-half of the for-
mula. Achieving safer workplaces require not only appropriate criminal
penalties, but also the presence of an aggressive criminal enforcement
campaign to provide for the maximum deterrent effect of the sanctions.
Passage of the OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act is essential to the
establishment of safe and healthy workplace conditions for this Nation's
workers. A goal established by Congress some twenty years ago. A goal
we have yet to achieve.
TIMOTHY G. GORBATOFF
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